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Abstract
Flood insurance differs widely in scope and form across Europe. Against the backdrop of
rising flood losses a debate about the role of EU policy in shaping the future of this
compensation tool is led by policy makers and industry. In this paper we investigate if and
how current EU policies influence flood insurance. While the question of supply and
demand is at the core of the debate, we argue that another key dimension is often
overlooked: how to use insurance as a lever for risk reduction and prevention efforts. We
investigate if and how current EU policies interplay with these two dimensions and then
reflect on the national policy level, by illustrating two conflicting cases of flood insurance:
the United Kingdom (UK), where flood insurance provision is widely available, but subject
to current reform, and the Netherlands, where efforts to introduce flood insurance have only
recently failed. In analysing the current positions on the role of the EU in shaping flood
insurance we conclude that there is wide agreement that harmonisation of flood insurance
offering across the EU is unlikely to be effective. We conclude that there is clear scope for the
EU to play a greater role in linking risk transfer and prevention, beyond existing channels, to
ensure an integrated approach to flood risk management across the EU.
Keywords: flood insurance; disaster risk reduction; Europe
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1. Introduction
Recent flood events across Europe have resulted in human tragedy and disruption to homes,
communities and business processes. Over the period of 2000 – 2012 average annual losses
were €4.2 billion (Jongman et al. 2014). How these flood losses are financed differs hugely
across the EU – insurance, state compensation schemes and liability are the most common
approaches. These mechanisms follow different principles, ranging from ex-ante to ex-post
funding, applying a solidarity based or market driven approach, and are based on varying
degrees of public-private partnership1 (Bouwer et al. 2007).
This existing patchwork has arisen for historic and cultural reasons, with different
perceptions and customs when it comes to dealing with flood risk (von Ungern-Sternberg
2004). Public awareness in their operation is usually highest after a significant flood event
(Cowan 2014), when those affected are looking for compensation. Beyond these reactive
responses to financial flood losses there is also a more forward looking dimension emerging,
triggering growing concerns about future risk levels in the wake of improved probabilistic
forecasting and flood risk mapping tools (for example awareness raised with the UK’s Flood
Maps; Wheater 2006). Latest projections show that flood risk is likely to increase – due to
socio-economic factors and to climate change: Jongman et al. (2014) produce probabilistic
estimates of future flood risk in Europe and show that by 2050 the predicted annual damage
will have increased to €23.5 billion (from around €4 billion predicted annual damage in
2010).
These trends are likely to pose a significant challenge for the financial compensation
mechanisms, unless more preventative measures such as flood defence investment and
stricter building codes are applied. Effective prevention is expected to play a significant role
for affordability and availability of compensation mechanisms, but it is far from clear how
these two approaches interact, and where the scope for future reform is. We argue that until
today efforts to reform flood compensation mechanisms in Europe are exclusively focused
on dealing with the financial losses, without considering the implications for managing the
underlying flood risks.
Amending existing compensation mechanisms or developing new tools requires political
will and stakeholder buy-in at different levels and over varying time-scales. The ad-hoc
payments after a flood are usually decided very quickly, often nationally, while changes to
the legal system are far more complex and require detailed preparation and elaboration.
Reforming insurance systems sits somewhere in the middle - but as recent national
experiences in the Netherlands and the UK show this process can also take very long, with
unclear outcome. Taking the 2014 UK floods as an example, within one month the
government had promised £20 million for extra flood defences, an ad-hoc continuation of the
current approach (BBC 2014), while the discussions for Flood Re (system reform) started in
2010 (Defra, 2011) with Flood Re’s expected launch date set for 2015 (Financial Times 2014).
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The case of insurance illustrates the complexities of existing governance arrangements:
Technical design of insurance products and demand and supply are amongst the factors that
determine how flood insurance works. Jurisdiction for this rests with Member States (MS),
and even at sub-national level, for example in Germany, where the Länder2 play a key role
(Schwarze and Wagner 2007). At the same time many policies relevant to insurability of
flood risk are guided by EU Directives – ranging from risk information and mapping,
prevention measures and compensation arrangements. This political and regulatory
infrastructure does have implications on the feasibility of flood insurance by potentially
reducing the underlying flood risk and making flood insurance more viable.
In this paper we investigate how the questions of compensation and prevention are linked,
and how this can be supported or hampered by public policy. We analyze this for flood
insurance, where the EU has instigated a debate on what the role of the EU should be in the
context of flood insurance and other disasters in Europe. The EU Green Paper on disaster
insurance, published in summer 2013 (EC 2013a), builds upon existent evidence to produce
insights that can guide potential actions at a European level to increase market penetration.
These include mandatory insurance, product bundling, public reinsurance or disaster pools.
There is ample evidence that insurance, or risk transfer in general, can boost resilience to
natural hazards more (effectively) than ex-post disaster aid (e.g. Ranger et al. 2011).
Insurance can reduce financial burdens and uncertainty (Ghesquiere and Mahul 2007;
Melecky and Raddatz 2011), and assists economies in dealing with the negative long run
impacts of natural hazards such as flooding (von Peter et al. 2012). Risk pricing may
encourage reduction of exposure and lead to lower damage costs (Bozzola 2014). Yet on the
other hand poorly designed insurance products and ill-structured insurance markets can
drive economic inefficiency and maladaptation to future risks (Surminski 2013). Hence the
focus on flood insurance is not simply a question of penetration rates, it also touches on
design and operational issues.
The EU Green Paper reflects on the concerns about rising risk levels and how this can be
accommodated through new and existing flood insurance schemes. The consultation
document frames insurance in two ways: the question of availability and affordability, and
the potential to use flood insurance as a lever for flood prevention and flood damage
mitigation.
We investigate if and how current EU policies interplay with these two dimensions and
reflect on the national policy level, by illustrating the cases of flood insurance in the UK and
the Netherlands. While at first these two dimensions appear separate, at least in terms of
their governance structure, we argue that they are interwoven: flood prevention impacts the
costs of an insurance policy, while at least in theory flood insurance could send signals
leading to more preventative or mitigative actions by those insured or the government (see,
for example, Kunreuther 1996, Botzen et al. 2009; Botzen and van den Bergh 2008; Shilling et
al. 1989; Treby et al. 2006). However, recent studies highlight a lack of integration of
prevention and risk transfer, and despite some positive examples there appears to be lack of
progress in terms of innovation and political decision-making (e.g. Surminski and Eldridge
2014).
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Taking the EU Green Paper as a starting point, we explore these two dimensions of flood
insurance. We first consider affordability and availability, and risk reduction linkages in an
EU context (section 2 and 3), and then gather insights from two very different cases of
insurance reform efforts at national level in the Netherlands and the UK (section 4). This is
followed by an analysis of how EU policy could help address the challenges at member state
level (section 5). We conclude by outlining the need for further research in section 6. Our
investigation is based on analysis of written and oral evidence, gathered through detailed
assessment of responses to the EU Green Paper on disaster insurance as well as discussions
with stakeholders at a recent workshop hosted by the authors, which reflected on successes,
gaps and action needed for flood insurance in Europe.

2. Current flood insurance arrangements in the European Union
Flood insurance is one option within the toolbox of flood risk management instruments. It
allows risk to be transferred financially, with a premium paid by the policyholder to the
insurer, effectively allowing those in at risk areas to continue to live and work with low
financial impact after a flood event. Public liability policies and compensation programs codesign the regulatory environment for damage compensation in which insurance is to
operate (Bozzola 2014; Crichton 2008; Paudel et al. 2012). Flood insurance is deemed most
effective as part of a comprehensive Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) strategy that includes
risk assessment and awareness, prevention policies and other damage compensation
instruments among others (Warner et al. 2009). The interplay of the above instruments varies
within and across countries, often as a result of multiple and conflicting views as to what
extent the public responses to flood risk should draw on principles of affordability, equity
and solidarity (Sugarman 2006). Local customs and traditions, as well as risk perception and
attitudes (e.g. Schwarze and Wagner 2007) also play an important role in determining the
extent of the underwriting of flood insurance products.
It is not surprising hence that the existing flood insurance products across Europe differ
widely in scope and reach (Bouwer et al. 2007; Schwarze et al. 2011). In France, the statemanaged CatNat system (Maccaferri et al. 2012) covers flood risk, offers low-priced
reinsurance and channels part of the resources into a state-managed fund for natural risk
prevention. The CatNat scheme is offered through private intermediaries and funded
through a flat rate surcharge (between 6% and 12%) over existent policies against property
damages (Botzen and van den Bergh 2008; Poussin et al. 2013). The scheme increases
affordability and reduces adverse selection, but does not encourage risk-reducing behaviour
and does not guarantee equity as rates are independent of agent’s income (Crichton 2008).
Alternatives to develop flood insurance in a solidarity context are in practice. For example,
the Spanish Insurance Compensation Consortium (CCS) scheme provides flood insurance on
a subsidiary basis if flood damages are not covered by private insurance. Similarly to CatNat
the CCS is funded via a flat rate surcharge. In order to promote private insurance, a
deductible over public compensations applies and private insurance is offered in a bundle
system (ICC 2014). Bundling makes flood insurance compulsory if you are insuring against
some selected risks (e.g., earthquake, storms), and vice versa. This system increases market
penetration, reduces adverse selection and encourages DRR through risk based pricing. Yet,
it may result in inequitable and even unaffordable premiums that increase the burden on the
4

public CCS (Sugarman 2006). This raises further consideration in regards to deductibles, coinsurance and caps (Sugarman 2006).
In Sweden, Portugal and Ireland flood insurance is voluntary and policies are issued and
managed by private companies. The State does not offer insurance itself nor financially back
the insurers. Portugal and Ireland apply risk-based pricing, with a certain degree of crosssubsidization in Ireland. On the other hand, the location of the asset does not influence the
premium to be paid in Sweden (Maccaferri et al. 2012). However, penetration rates appear to
be mostly driven by factors other than pricing. In Sweden and Ireland, mortgage lenders
require borrowers to insure buildings, resulting in penetration rates above 90% (Maccaferri
et al. 2012). In Portugal, where this condition does not apply, penetration rates are much
lower (50%) and insurers are required to constitute a (tax-exempt) equalisation reserve to
prevent cash-flow depletion in the event of a significant unforeseen catastrophe. In the UK
flood insurance is provided by private insurers on a bundled basis, reaching high
penetration rates due to mortgage requirements, while the roles and responsibilities of public
and private players is currently being reviewed as part of the proposed introduction of Flood
Re (section 4). In the Netherlands no flood insurance is available beyond some commercial
policies.
How the roles of public and private agents are split differs also widely across the spectrum.
In the case of genuine private insurance markets, the role of the state can be limited to
preserving fair competition and financial viability of the insurer. When the pre-conditions for
private markets are not fulfilled, or the potential positive externalities of insurance are not
internalised, state interventions may boost insurance markets either by backing up the
private insurers, e.g. government lead reinsurance or investing in preventative measures or
by compelling insurance, and by doing so expanding the market. Balancing the trade-off
between insurance affordability and the solvency of an insurer may in some situations
demand public support. By imposing mandatory flood insurance governments resort to
solidarity which, in justified cases, may create conditions of equitable sharing of the burden.
In addition there is the aspect of flood risk management – which is widely regarded as a
public function, although budgetary constraints may change this approach, as seen in the
UK, where there is a quest for private flood investment and individual risk management
action. Under the UK’s Statement of Principles approach to flood insurance, the public
investment in flood defences was spelled out as a government commitment, but with the
newly proposed Flood Re there appears to be less focus on the public risk management role
(Surminski and Eldridge, 2014 – see also section 4). Strengthening the observation that,
seemingly, the most prominent element of the system is to share the financial burden of
flooding rather than reducing expected losses.

3. The current EU flood policy context and the interplay with flood
insurance
The decision if and how flood insurance is designed reflects country specific risk features in
addition to loss experience, which plays a key role. EU policies can influence this to some
5

extent – in table 1 we summarize how the existing EU policy instruments interact with the
provision of insurance. These policy tools can be grouped into three large categories: those
explicitly aimed at the regulation of insurance market (Solvency I and II and other insurance
market regulations); those implicitly affecting insurance provision through flood risk
assessment and management; and those implicitly affecting insurance provision through
compensation arrangements outside insurance.
Table 1: EU legislative instruments and their relationship to insurance provision
Policy

Relevance
Impact on flood insurance
for
flood
insurance
Solvency I
Explicit
Insurance systems will have to accommodate the remit of
(Directive
Solvency II ensuring that schemes are economically risk
73/239/EEC and
secure. Solvency II determines the risk appetite as well as
others) and
the internal risk portfolio decisions of insurance
Solvency II
companies. It demands a structured risk-based approach to
(Directive
assess the solvency risks faced by insurance and
2009/138/EC)
reinsurance companies, including flood insurance (EC
2009). It also regulates the assessment and validation of the
methods being used to do so. If validated, evidence that
these methods are actually followed should be provided
(EC 2009). Finally, it imposes an upper limit on the
probability that the annual losses exceed company’s
operating capital (EC 2009).
Competition
Implicit
Competition law can influence how public and private
rules, state aid
sectors may collaborate through public-private partnerships
(PPP). State aid regulation controls public recovery aid to
economic undertakings without distorting the internal
market. Recently, Commission Regulation 651/2014
exempted aid to make good damage caused by natural
disasters from the obligation to notify the state aid,
pursuant to the specific conditions.
Environmental
Implicit
ELD imposes an obligation of preventing or remedying of
liability
environmental damage at source and by the polluter, in
directive (ELD,
accordance with the Article 191(2) TFEU. It distinguishes
Directive
strict and fault-based liability but stops short of imposing
2004/35/EC)
financial guarantees in case of insolvency; rather it leaves it
for the discretion to the MS to develop financial security
instruments and markets.
Water
Implicit
Establishes River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) based
Framework
on a better understanding of pressures, impacts and
Directive
economic analysis. The WFD stressed the role of economic
(Directive
instruments in achieving a ‘good ecological status’ (EC,
2000/60/EC)
2000). Although it specifically referred to water pricing,
this has resulted in practice in a much wider diversity of
6

Floods
Directive
(Directive
2007/60/EC)

Implicit

European
Implicit
Union
Solidarity Fund
(EUSF)

EU legislation
on disaster risk
prevention and
management

Implicit

economic instruments, including insurance. The ‘good
ecological status’ should contribute to ‘mitigating the
effects of floods’ (EC 2000).
Flooding risk maps (EC, 2007, chap. III) and assessments
are instrumental for a sound determination of risk
premiums. The FD is expected to contribute to reduce
exposure and vulnerability, and increase risk awareness.
The flood risk management plans will specify and
prioritise interventions for flood risk reduction.
EUSF provides assistance to MS for coping with major
natural and/or extraordinary regional disasters3. Solidarity
Fund aid can be mobilized up to a maximum annual total
of 500 million EUR (in 2011 prices). The EUSF
contributions are meant for essential public emergency and
recovery operations only but may unbound public
resources for recovery aid to households and private
enterprises. The 2014 EUSF reform places emphasis on the
MS’s compliance with the Union legislation on disaster risk
prevention and management, and prevention policies to
avoid similar disasters in the future.
The Union Civil Protection Mechanism facilitates
cooperation and coordination in the field of civil
protection, through systematic risk assessments and risk
management planning among others. The proposed
Council Decision on the implementation of the Solidarity
clause (Article 222 of the Lisbon Treaty) foresees, starting
from 2015, an annual integrated threat and risk assessment
report at Union level.

Table 1 indicates that there are various ways through which the EU policies influence
coverage and uptake of insurance; mainly through an implicit, indirect channel rather than
through explicit regulatory measures.
The objectives of the EU regulation on insurance and reinsurance is to impose an upper limit
on the probability that the annual losses exceed company’s operating capital (EC 2009). This
is aimed at enforcing insurance contracts and ensuring that insurers are solvent and pay
what they owe. In addition there are EU policies on competition and market operations,
which drive private sector operations. Beyond this most rules are set nationally - such as
insurance scheme licensing and taxation, as the UK and the Netherlands examples show (see
section 3). In addition, states typically create guaranty funds through which solvent insurers
step up and provide at least limited benefits for claimants whose insurers have financially
collapsed, either through public (e.g., Spain, France) or private (e.g., UK) reinsurance. This
The Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002, amended in 2014, specifies major natural disasters as
those having caused direct damage above 3 billion EUR (in 2011 prices) or 0.6 per cent of Gross
National Income (GNI) of the country affected. Extraordinary regional disasters are those having
caused damage above 1.5 per cent of the GDP at regional (NUTS2) level.
3
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regulatory framework reduces uncertainty and provides a sound background for higher
market penetration. Noteworthy, though, demanding legal frameworks may make the
insurance against infrequent disasters with long accumulation processes non attractive to
insurers and reinsurers (Sugarman 2006). This may be aggravated by some national tax law
rules that discourage premium collection without pay-outs (Paudel et al. 2012). Finally, even
if insurable (e.g., solvency laws are properly balanced and tax exemptions are provided),
premiums may be unaffordable or inequitable.
Policies in support of flood risk prevention can indirectly influence flood insurance,
particularly those measures that succeed in reducing risk levels, improving data
quality/availability and clarifying roles and responsibilities of stakeholders. The Water
Framework Directive (WFD) and the Floods Directive (FD) are examples, credited with
improved mapping of all water related risks, and holistic water management at the river
basin (district) level. The WFD and FD contribute to a better appreciation of multiple risks,
and a more effective coordination and management. Traditionally, flood risk management
placed an emphasis on structural protection, although there is a growing awareness that this
(alone) is not enough. Investing in water retention infrastructure shows positive and
increasing marginal costs, since more exposed areas are increasingly expensive to protect
(Crichton 2008). In spite of this, engineering works have been previously implemented on
the grounds of their significantly lower transaction costs, i.e. the costs of reaching an
agreement, even in the cases where the investment costs were higher (Garrick et al. 2013).
However, recent climate projections indicate that flood hazard is on the rise in some regions
(IPCC 2012; UNISDR 2012) at a moment when budgetary constraints have increased the
opportunity costs (i.e., foregone benefits) of hard engineering in some countries. In addition,
water retention infrastructure can twist risk perception and has resulted in a number of cases
with concentrated populations, wealth and property values in highly exposed areas (EC,
2007), which often hold some comparative advantages (e.g., aesthetic values, better soils,
strategic locations near ports). The EU Floods Directive is cautious about the negative
downstream impacts that may arise in highly engineered rivers and encourages long term
developments based on soft engineering, such as sustainable land use practices (EC, 2007)
taking into account the entire river basin.
As a part of the State Aid Modernisation initiative (EC 2012), the Commission has revised and
simplified both de minimis aid regulation and the general block exemption regulation (GBER).
The reform of de minimis aid (EC 2013b) maintained the ceiling of 200.000 EUR for each
single undertaking over a period of three fiscal years4 irrespective of the form of aid and
expressed as net present value if granted through periodic instalments. If granted in other than
direct grant, such as soft loan or guarantee, the gross grant equivalent of the aid needs to be
estimated. A subsidised loan up to 1.000.000 EUR over a period of 5 years is possible under
the revised de minimis aid rules if the loan is secured by collateral covering to the level of at
least 50 percent of the loan. The Commission Regulation 651/2014 (EC 2014) exempted aid to
make good damage caused by natural disasters from the obligation to notify the state aid,
pursuant to the following conditions: First, the regulation declared ‘earthquakes, landslides,
floods (in particular floods brought about by waters overflowing river banks or lake shores),
avalanches, tornadoes, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions and wildfires of natural origin’ (ibid,
4
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recital 69 and Article 50(1)) as events constituting a natural disaster, while excluding damage
arising from adverse weather conditions (frost, hail, ice, rain or drought). Second, the
damaging event has to be recognized by competent authorities as a natural disaster, and a
clear causal link needs to be established between the disaster and damage suffered. The total
payments for making good the damage, including the payments under insurance policy,
may not exceed 100 per cent of eligible damage costs. Third, the aid scheme has to be
introduced within three years, and any aid granted within four years after the disaster.
Fourth, the eligible damage costs include material damage incurred as a result of disaster
and loss of income resulting from suspension of activity for a period of six months after the
disaster event occurred. The damage assessment based on repair cost or economic value of
the affected asset before the disaster should be certified by accredited experts or insurance
undertaking.
Public compensation funds can create disincentives for risk reduction and transfer, as we
show in example of the Netherlands (see section 4). The provision of State Aid as a tool to
compensate for flood losses can play a key role in terms of expectation by those at flood risk
and willingness to buy of insurance. In the UK there is no direct ex-post aid and reliance on
insurance is important to minimise damage and loss. In a historical context the possibility of
the Government introducing a ‘National Disaster Fund’ in the early 1960s spurred on the
industry to provide a private industry solution, a response to the worry that it would lead to
a reduction in demand for catastrophe cover on the private market (Bek 2013). In principle,
State Aid to economic undertakings should be limited to the residual uncertainty (i.e., the
flood risk with a very small though unpredictable likelihood and a potentially high though
unpredictable damage) that cannot be possibly addressed in an efficient, equitable and
affordable way with the previous barriers. Given the low probability of these events,
insurance provision and DRR would not be affected by State Aid. State Aid is better funded
via ex-ante flood emergency funds (e.g., via a surcharge on existing premiums) and better
allotted through grants and loans (Sugarman 2006). In reality, though, the barriers to State
Aid tend to fade after a crisis. Quoting insufficient prevention, deficient insurance regulation
and market penetration and even flaws in tort law design become altogether evident and the
State assumes the costs, sometimes using allotment mechanisms that may hinder
competency (e.g., tax exemptions, debit write-offs, reduction of social security contributions)
(OJ 2012). Since 2007, 34 ad hoc compensation schemes for flood damage were notified and
approved by the EC for a total value amounting to 1,700 million Euros (EC 2014). Although
aiding overwhelmed communities can be morally laudable on the grounds of altruism and
solidarity, this is neither equitable (only a relatively small share of the EU is truly at risk), nor
sustainable: discouraged DRR coupled with climate change will likely increase in the future
the already large impacts over the public budget.
Finally, competition law also shapes flood insurance. The proposed new Flood Re scheme is
subject to EU rules as the proposed levy on insurance customers is seen as a de-facto tax,
which is passed into the Flood-Re Pool (Defra, 2013). A decision by the EC and the
conclusion of the EU clearance process is expected by April 2015 (Thoresen and Evans 2014).
The EU rules on competition state that ‘aid to make good the damage caused by natural
disasters’ are compatible with the requirements of the internal market (EC 2008) and as such
State Aid designation for Flood Re can be expected to be reviewed by the EC on this basis.

9

What remains unclear is if and how these policies influence design and implementation of
flood insurance and how this in turn could drive a linkage of compensation and prevention.

4. The national context: the examples of the Netherlands and the
UK
The above policy framework indicates how existing EU policies can send signals to influence
national flood insurance provision. If and how this shapes the coverage and take-up, as well
as the design of insurance is described through the cases of the Netherlands and the UK,
both at opposing ends of the spectrum of flood insurance penetration in the EU.

4.1 The Netherlands
Flood risk management in the Netherlands relies strongly on hard engineering which is
focused on flood protection infrastructure. This is a historically created situation in which
water managers have developed highly qualified flood protection systems with the highest
safety standards in the world. A major storm surge in 1953, which flooded large coastal areas
in the Southwest of the Netherlands (about 200,000 hectares), initiated a boost in technical
innovations in flood protection measures. The Dutch government stated that a large storm
surge flood may happen again and, therefore, initiated the ‘Delta Plan’. This plan led to the
construction of the ‘Deltaworks’, which are comprehensive systems of dams, sluices, dikes,
and storm surge barriers constructed between 1958 and 1997. As a result, low-lying floodprone parts of the Netherlands are divided in 53 areas which have their own closed system
of flood protection (so called “dyke-ring areas”). These flood defences are built high enough
to prevent overtopping by extreme flood waters that occur on average between 1/10,000 and
1/1,250 years, although several areas near rivers remain unprotected or have lower
protection standards.
The current safety standards in the Netherlands have been under discussion because of an
increase in properties exposed to floods during the past several decades, which substantially
increased potential flood damage (de Moel et al. 2011). Moreover, the projected increase in
flood risk as a result of climate change could justify higher safety standards in some areas, or
additional measures that limit potential flood damage (Kind, 2013). Although the prevention
of floods will always remain the dominant strategy in Dutch water management policy,
other measures have received increasing attention since high river discharges in 1993 and
1995 almost resulted in large-scale flooding in the Netherlands. Alternative strategies that are
receiving increasing attention are the development of flood insurance, the flood-proofing of
houses to limit damage during floods as well as soft engineering and spatial planning
measures that limit potential flood damage.
Standard home and home contents insurance policies in the Netherlands exclude coverage
for damage caused by flooding. Flood damage can be partly compensated by the
government via the Calamities and Compensation Act (WTS – Wet Tegmoetkoming Schade bij
Rampen en Zware Ongevallen in Dutch), which has been in force since 1998. The WTS is an ad
10

hoc compensation arrangement for which no funds have been established and, there are no
clearly predefined rules about the criteria for which cases, and by how much, flood damage
will be compensated. The cabinet needs to give separate approval to compensate damage of
saltwater floods which are explicitly excluded from the WTS (Botzen et al. 2010). There is no
legal obligation for the government to compensate flood damage, meaning that the
government is not officially liable. Thus, it is uncertain whether households in the
Netherlands will receive compensation for damage caused by flooding.
Over the last several years there has been debate about the desirability of the introduction of
flood insurance. This debate has been motivated by a desire of the government to limit the
financing of compensation for natural disaster damage from general taxes (Botzen et al.
2010), consumer demand for more certainty of flood coverage (Botzen and van den Bergh,
2012a,b), potential financial efficiencies of private instead of public compensation schemes
(Jongejan and Barrieu 2008), and possibilities to use insurance with risk-based premiums to
stimulate policyholders to invest in flood damage mitigation measures (Botzen et al. 2009).
The extreme character of flood risk in the Netherlands with the uncertain potential for
catastrophically high damages, implies that private flood coverage would be expensive
relative to the expected value of flood damage (Paudel et al. 2013). Therefore, flood insurance
may be best offered in the form of a public-private partnership in which the government
provides coverage for extreme flood risks, while insurance companies provide coverage for
flood damage up to a certain maximum amount (Botzen and van den Bergh 2008; Paudel et
al. 2014). The government can provide such coverage as State Aid, or act as a reinsurer
meaning that the government receives compensation for this coverage by means of a
premium that equals the expected value of flood losses covered. Discussions were ongoing
between 2006 and 2010 amongst Dutch insurers and the government about introducing such
public-private flood insurance, which were ended by the government. The official reason for
this was that levying the premium for this compulsory insurance was regarded as
undesirable during times of economic crisis.
In September 2012, a coverholder of Lloyd’s introduced a catastrophe insurance policy in the
Netherlands, which allows homeowners to purchase insurance coverage for flood damage
bundled with earthquake and terrorism risks. From a DRR perspective, interesting features
of this insurance are that it aims to raise risk awareness and charges risk based insurance
premiums on which policyholders receive premium discounts if they take measure to “floodproof” their home. Flood risk information is provided on the insurer’s website on which
individuals can enter their zip code level to access location specific information about flood
probabilities, quality of flood defences, potential water levels, and the risk based insurance
premium. Four different measures are eligible for a premium discount of 5% each: namely,
installing electrical equipment and the central heating installation above the ground floor
level, having flood shields available, and having a water-resistant floor on the ground floor
level, such as tiles. However, this insurance is unlikely to result in broad insurance coverage
of flood risks in the Netherlands, because it is only available for homeowners and not for
tenants, its availability per dike ring area is limited, coverage is limited to €75,000 per policy,
while the premium is relatively high compared with estimates of homeowner’s willingnessto-pay (WTP) for flood insurance (Botzen and van den Bergh 2012a, b). For example,
according to the Dutch Consumer Association (2012) the premium of the catastrophe
insurance in flood-prone areas is about €200 per month, although the premium varies widely
11

depending on the actual flood risk that the homeowner faces. Estimated demand curves
based on the WTP derived from a choice experiment show that only a very small percentage
of the households in flood-prone areas who own a house with a ground floor would be
interested to purchase the policy for this premium (Botzen and van den Bergh, 2012b).
However, this demand could be up to 50% if flood insurance premiums would be priced to
the expected value of flood losses.
A broad flood insurance coverage could have been established by a proposal by the Dutch
insurance union made in 2013 to introduce a flood insurance pool. All Dutch property
insurers would compulsory contribute to this pool and offer flood coverage as part of regular
property insurance policies of €250,000 and €25,000, respectively, for property and contents
damages. This pool would cover up to a maximum of €5 billion of flood damages, meaning
that the government could compensate damages exceeding this amount through the WTS,
resulting indirectly in a public-private flood insurance arrangement. This proposal was
rejected in June 2013 by the Dutch Authority for Consumer and Market because the
compulsory character of the pool could limit competition in the Dutch insurance market
(ACM 2013).
In summary, the characteristics of the Dutch flood damage compensation system have been
very much influenced by local risk and economic characteristics, meaning that these local
challenges are unlikely to be resolved by a European “one size fits all” natural disaster
insurance solution. The government focus on flood prevention after the catastrophic 1953
North Sea flood has substantially lowered flood probabilities, and created a situation in
which the government is regarded as being liable for the compensation of flood damage once
flood protection infrastructure fails. Over the last decade the increased interest in
introducing flood insurance has been partly complicated by the extreme lowprobability/high-impact nature of flood risks in the Netherlands which results in relatively
high premiums for limited commercial flood insurance coverage. Proposed solutions for
compulsory (public-) private flood insurance have been obstructed by concerns about limited
competition in the Dutch insurance market. European regulations that foster knowledge on
flood risks could reduce uncertainty of flood insurance premium estimation and facilitate the
creation of a flood insurance market. Moreover, improved insights on potential damage
saving from flood damage mitigation measures and the effectiveness of insurance incentives
for implementing such measures could help the design of a flood insurance system that
integrates disaster risk reduction.

4.2 Flood risk management and insurance in the UK
Flood insurance in the UK is provided by private insurers as part of the home-insurance
bundle. This has led to high insurance penetration rates: 91% for buildings (Defra 2013) and
74.9% for contents (ABI 2012), principally due to the need to have insurance when taking out
a mortgage. However there remains a disparity amongst low income households, where only
29% have buildings insurance (Defra 2013). The role of mortgage providers in requiring
owner occupiers to hold buildings insurance as part of their mortgage arrangement is
another key factor for maintaining this high penetration rate and forms an important element
in within the arena of insurance provision.
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The current UK flood insurance arrangement, an agreement termed the Statement of
Principles (SoP), is based on a partnership approach to address flood risk (evolution of this
approach can be seen in Appendix 3). It sets the foundations for flood risk management from
government, as well as maintaining wide financial protection and risk transfer from the
insurance industry. Despite its innovative nature, this approach was always considered as a
temporary solution by the private insurers, as it was seen to distort the market and
preventing specialist flood insurance providers to emerge (ABI 2008).
Under the SoP, Government agreed to invest in flood defences, enhance planning regulation
to prevent uncontrolled development in high flood risk areas, and increase transparency
through improved flood risk data provision. In exchange the insurance industry committed
to offer flood insurance to all homes up to a 1 in 75 year risk level. Pricing and conditions of
cover were left to the private sector, which led to growing concerns about affordability of
cover within government. Insurers on the other hand were increasingly unconvinced that
government was doing enough to reduce flood risk. Particularly in times of public spending
cuts, a heated debate about investment in flood risk management arose - insurers expressed
their disappointment to an announcement that government investment in defences was cut
when taking into account inflation5 (ABI 2010). This remains an extremely political issue: the
lack of flood defence spending has been highlighted as a concern in the most recent flood
event [December 2013- January 2014] (HM Parliament 2014). In addition it is unclear how
effective efforts to reform the planning system have been. Some experts state that over the
last 10 years still 13% of all new development (21,000 homes and businesses) has been built
on floodplain (ASC 2012).
Between 2011 and 2013 industry and government investigated a new approach to the
provision of flood insurance. At the outset the Government and the Association of British
Insurers (ABI) listed guiding principles for a new insurance solution:
Table 2: Principles guiding flood insurance provision in the UK (Source: Defra 2011).

5

Over the previous four year spending review period (2007/8- 2010/11) the government allocated £2.562bn to
flood and coastal defence and in the current spending period (2011/12-2014/15) the government have
allocated £2.315bn. These figures are priced in real terms at based on 2012/13 prices.
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What reads as a wish list, based on expectations that stakeholders have towards flood
insurance, it also shows that there are several trade-offs at play. Achieving all of those
principles simultaneously appears almost impossible.
After more than two years of negotiations both sides have agreed to create a new flood
insurance pool – termed Flood Re (Defra and ABI 2013), due to commence in summer 2015.
Flood Re is based on households under low to normal risk issued with standard insurance
provision with the free market, and high risk properties under the Flood Re pool. The
subsidy for the latter is claimed from a levy taken from all policyholders and is
approximately £10.50 per policy. The premiums offered for high risk households are fixed
based on council tax banding and cover is offered at a set price, this is based on a particular
threshold level for defining high risk, yet to be determined. The government proposal
envisages that small business would not be covered by the Pool with several other exclusions
including leasehold properties over a certain size and Band H properties. However this latter
is now subject to debate and several other technical aspects remain unclear, including the
handling of flood losses beyond a suggested cap of 1 in 200 loss event. As such there remain
several key points to operation and delivery of the new scheme that will be subject to
agreement between insurers and government.
With regards to risk prevention the industry itself has pointed to the need for policies in
support of insurance and risk reduction. This has been highlighted by the ABI’s adaptation
manifesto - Appendix 2, a call for public policies that aim at reducing climate risks (ABI
2007). This refers to the ‘two-way-relationship’ of insurance and prevention: Availability of
cover, affordability and the role of private and public players and how they could be
influenced by rising flood risk. While at the same time insurance could also steer prevention
and flood risk reduction efforts by sending risk price signals. Risk reduction is not explicitly
considered in the Flood Re scheme – an aspect that has triggered some criticism (Surminski
and Eldridge 2014).
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It is important to recognize that there may be scope for regional differences: Crichton (2012)
exemplifies an approach in Scotland to involving insurers in Flood Liaison and Advice
Groups (FLAGs). Insurers sit on these groups alongside several other key stakeholders in the
planning, development and water management arena. They aim to resolve flooding issues
on an informal basis but also importantly ensure flood insurance will be available –
providing essential knowledge from the insurance side but also establishing a link between
planning authorities and the insurance industry (Crichton 2012).
Within the UK the devolved regions have developed their own approaches to transposing
EU Directives into UK legislation: examples are the Flood Risk Regulations 2009 and Flood
and Water Management Act 2010. This has resulted in the driving forward of risk mapping
from all sources and is a particularly important influence in the recent publication of a
national (and locally detailed) surface water flooding maps. The lack of which was initially
highlighted by the 2007 flooding- of which two thirds was a result of surface water (Pitt
2008). As flood mapping and modelling is becoming increasingly accurate and detailed to
the property level, risk differentiation can be made to ensure better understanding of exactly
which properties are at risk. This can be expected to continue to progress with an increased
availability of data, particularly with a national database of property level risk being made
available from the ABI to the government under the proposed new system (Defra and ABI
2013). This is also interesting as national flood policy measures are usually considered
somewhat reactive and often legislation is brought into play after large flood events, as in the
case of the Flood and Water Management Act in 2010 as a response to the 2007 flooding and
the question of responsibilities at the time (EFRA 2009).

5. Perspectives on the way forward for flood insurance in Europe
Against the backdrop of the above policy framework and the national – EU interplay there is
an ongoing discussion about how to address existing lack of coverage and low uptake of
insurance as well as the design aspects of insurance schemes, particularly for risk reduction.
This has been at the core of the EU Green Paper (GP), and the responses that it triggered.
We reflect on positions expressed as part of the Green Paper consultation and as part of a
recent workshop hosted by the authors on this topic.

5.1 Reflections at EU level
Contemplations about flood insurance by EU institutions can be inferred from two
documents: the EC’s GP and the European Parliament’s response. The GP sparked the initial
discussion by asking if the EU led action on disaster insurance around a system concerned
with balancing affordability, DRR incentives, and internalizing possible public good
externalities for high insurance penetration rates was warranted or desired. The GP placed
an emphasis on systems that promote high insurance penetration rates as the GP states that a
lack of insurance is a sign of vulnerability, emphasising insurance as a tool to minimize
recovery time and to smooth income interruptions due to flood events. Examples of possible
EU-lead systems in the GP are mandatory insurance purchasing or risk bundling. The
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affordability of insurance is also a key concern in the GP – with a reference to the potential
trade–off arising from risk pricing: while risk pricing creates strong DRR incentives it can
produce very high premiums that can prevent low income groups from buying insurance.
Responding to the GP and reflecting on the results of the public consultation exercise the
European Parliament’s response differed from the GP by stating that insurance should
remain voluntary and the market should remain as flexible as possible so that products can
be tailored to local requirements. Therefore, the Parliament’s view is that it is not prudent to
harmonize disaster insurance. The European Parliament (EP, 2014) took a critical view on the
state-mandated insurance scheme hinted at in the GP. It declined the existence of a market
distortion that could be rectified only through EU wide intervention and rejected a ‘one-sizefits-all’ solution to low market penetration of flood insurance schemes across Europe.
Instead, tailor-made insurance products designed according to the type of risk; the country
specific prevention and preparedness policies as well as capacity to respond to unfolding
hazards should be favoured. Flexible insurance markets and voluntary underwriting are in
the view of the EP more suited for insurance companies to develop appropriate products.
A recent opinion of the Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen in a similar although unrelated
case (C-525/12, European Commission against Germany) suggests that the European Court
of Justice (ECJ), in case of doubt, is more inclined to sustain the discretion of the Member
States in choosing an (economic) policy instrument to meet collectively adopted policy
targets. In this case, the European Commission referred Germany to the ECJ for a ‘too
narrow interpretation’ of water services under the Water Framework Directive (WFD,
2000/60/EC). In the Commission’s view, although the WFD makes it possible for the Member
States to choose on which water services to impose the cost recovery requirement and to
what degree, Germany has used this discretion to exclude all but two water services from the
mandatory cost recovery regime. The Advocate General (Jääskinen 2014) described the
Commission complaint as ambiguous but underscored the Member States’ discretion of
choosing an economic or other instrument best suitable for the given purpose.
A further concern at the EU level, as noted in the European Parliament’s response, is the
possibility of charity hazard whereby government-sponsored prevention (or compensation)
lowers a citizen’s incentive to protect themselves (see e.g., Hung 2009). This view is very
similar to results of the public consultation in calling for little harmonization and placing a
central role on DRR in order to manage disaster risk and insurance. The European
Parliament’s response states that expenditure on prevention is more efficient than recovery
expenditure, while the GP argues that DRR in addition to lowering risk also lowers
insurance premiums. Therefore, member states are called upon to invest in DRR in the
European Parliament’s response while at the same time combining DRR investment with
strategies promoting individual responsibility.
In the public consultation, the UK treasury responded that disaster insurance harmonisation
is unwarranted; echoed by the Dutch, Finnish, Estonian, Czech and Spanish governments or
governmental bodies (the majority of responses are from governmental bodies). Moreover,
these responses acknowledged the role of insurance as an indirect incentive for DRR. The
Spanish view differed slightly in saying that as the Spanish catastrophe insurance is
solidarity based as to provide an affordable compensation mechanism, DRR is the province
of the state and not policyholders. Participants in European insurance market also provided
responses to the GP in a similar tone in calling for the minimum of harmonization. Both
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groups take this view as the GP posits several possible ideas of how to structure insurance
products, such as compulsory insurance purchasing or risk bundling, because they may stifle
innovation in insurance products or not fit the tastes of consumers in specific markets. This
stance is because the risk profiles of member states are different and require the free choice of
market agents and market incentives to tailor insurance products and coverage to local
needs. Not only are the risk profiles different between countries but so are attitudes towards
risk and insurance. For instance, the UK follows a risk based approach while Spain takes a
solidarity based approach; moving from one approach to the other might not be politically
acceptable within the local risk culture; for instance in Germany compulsory disaster
insurance may be illegal. Therefore, the industry and national body responses indicate that
the insurance market should have minimal EU interference, so that markets can offer what
local customers want. This line of reasoning shows that there is no one size fits all solution
that could be imposed by the EU because the current arrangements have evolved in response
to local needs and attitudes.
Taken as a whole the submitted responses to the GP indicate that there is little appetite for
the EU to take a top-down approach regarding the provision of insurance because regional
risk profiles and cultures are too different. Therefore, the responses indicate that the
provision of insurance should remain in the hands of the member states. At the same time a
stronger EU role in terms of flood risk management maybe feasible, with the EU facilitating
flood risk management across different countries. Within the European Parliament’s
response, for example, it is stated that the best role for the EU is as a facilitator for spreading
knowledge and providing better, international comparable and freely accessible data.

5.2 Reflections from the Munich Workshop
The workshop organized by the authors consisted of mainly representatives from the
insurance industry and academia (Appendix 1) and the overall view expressed echoed the
perception that there is no one size fits all solution regarding insurance provision. Regional
differences and cultures means that a single style of insurance provision that is suitable
across all regions of Europe may be impossible to find. Therefore, the responsibility should
be left to national regulators and/or competitive forces to tailor insurance provision to local
needs, in this view. Furthermore, the representatives present at the workshop agreed that
DRR is key and should play a central role regarding both insurance and risk management.
Keeping this in mind, the discussions during the workshop identified several barriers to
connecting DRR and insurance or other structures that may strengthen insurance provision;
some of which may be removed with action from the EU.
The first observation from the workshop’s discussion was that it appears that it is hard for
different insurance or DRR stakeholders to work together. Which when combined with the
time that it takes to change behaviours creates a degree of institutional deadlock that
prevents countries from altering their disaster insurance systems. The workshop also
perceived that the problems which impede the creation of new partnerships, such as publicprivate partnership insurance provision, are often compounded by the observation that no
one “owns” flood risk, creating coordination problems that strengthen the inertia behind
current systems. There is generally not one governmental office that has responsibility for
disaster risk management (or its aftermath) and so different aspects of risk management are
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allocated between different offices. The lack of a central coordinator for the various
stakeholders involved in flood risk management strengthens the various barriers currently
preventing better management of the problem. Moreover, the instability of political
preferences about forming flood insurance partnerships also adds to deadlock. For example,
in the Netherlands it was initially the government who took the initiative for discussions
with the insurance sector to promote the insurability of flood risks (Botzen et al. 2010).
However, later this was reversed with the government blocking public-private flood
insurance. While there may be little appetite for the EU to aid directly in the creation of
partnerships there may be room for the EU to assist indirectly. For example, if governmental
responsibility for natural disaster risk was transferred to a single government office there
would be a natural locus for the various stakeholders to converge upon. Furthermore, the
European Parliament’s preferred role of the EU as a facilitator for information dissemination
could also be useful by sharing information regarding best practice on how to bring together
stakeholders and to prevent discussions from stagnating or by providing a neutral arbitrator.
The second perception that the workshop identified as holding backing insurance and DRR
is the information available. The insurers present stated that they had a good and improving
technical understanding of risk but they were missing information on the socio-economic
drivers of disaster risk. Accessible risk information might also differ across regions making it
harder to integrate or may not be available at an appropriate scale. There is also a strand of
information missing about how effective various DRR measures are, so that insurance
premiums could be correctly tailored. The information the insurers, governments and other
stakeholders require is an area where the EU could facilitate. For instance, the EU could
promote a common way of investigating or mapping risk so that the information provided
by the various member state bodies can be integrated together. For example, the EU Floods
Directive aims, in part, to produce such information, and the view of the workshop was that
such projects are very useful. Not only for providing information but for also forcing various
stakeholders to work together helping to overcome institutional deadlock.
The third observation is that the insurers present at the workshop stated that while insurance
can promote DRR indirectly via risk based premiums, DRR is mainly the role of the state.
The provision of large scale DRR projects lowers risk and allows insurance to be affordable;
potentially creating a virtuous-circle for DRR. During the workshop it was argued that the
state should provide large scale DRR projects because the state can take into account the
whole area at risk, the relevant planning rules, access to finance, etc. The EU may be able to
facilitate member states with investing in DRR by helping to share information between
member states regarding best practice and the relative merits of different DRR projects. A
further way that the EU could facilitate DRR investment was discussed during the workshop
and involved changing the role of the European Solidarity Fund (EUSF). Currently the EUSF
can dispense aid if a country is affected by a disaster causing 0.6% of Gross National Income
or €3 billion in damage. It was expressed that EUSF funding reduces the financial pressure
that disasters place on governments, which in turn can reduce the incentive of governments
to invest in DRR projects. The workshop argued that if the EUSF was converted to a
mechanism for subsidizing investment in DRR activities it would provide an incentive for
states to invest in DRR thanks to a movement away from an ex-post mechanism towards and
ex-ante mechanism.
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The final perceived barrier that the workshop discussed was the use of risk based pricing.
The workshop participants agreed that the use of risk based pricing is required, but not a
sufficient, condition for preventing moral hazard and incentivizing DRR. However, the
participants noted that different European countries have different approaches towards risk
based pricing and as such trade off affordability against risk based pricing to differing
national degrees of acceptability. However, there seems little appetite for EU harmonisation
of risk based pricing across Europe due to regional differences. However, facilitating the
spread of information regarding the benefits or weaknesses of insurance systems, based on
different degrees of risk pricing, can offer member states more information about different
insurance systems.

6. Conclusion and reflection on next steps needed
Flood insurance differs widely in scope and form across Europe (see for example CEA 2009,
p.18 Table 2). The current patchwork of public and private schemes is influenced by public
policy – directly through regulation such as mandating cover or instigating the development
of new schemes. And indirectly by providing the enabling infrastructure and environment,
for example through a broad risk reduction framework, including building codes and better
flood risk data provisions. The policy signals come from EU, national and in some cases
regional level – usually aimed at demand and supply of flood insurance, with affordability
and the question of insurability as the key pillars of the debate.
Recent flood losses and the publication of the GP in 2013 have revived the debate about the
future of flood insurance in Europe. While the question of supply and demand is at the core
of the public discourse, we argue that another key dimension is often overlooked: how to use
insurance as a lever for risk reduction and flood prevention efforts.
In this paper we explored if and how current EU policies influence flood insurance. We
notice a degree of direct impact through regulation and competition rules, determining the
way private insurers can offer flood insurance (and other products) across the EU, as well as
indirect influence through measures aimed at flood risk management and state aid to make
good the damage caused by natural disasters. However, the design and implementation of
insurance schemes remains a national concern. Reflecting on the current debate about the
future of flood insurance in the EU we find little appetite for harmonization of flood
insurance arrangements across the EU. The wide variety of existing insurance schemes, as
well as different supply and demand patterns, show that there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution
as is clear from the Netherlands and UK cases.
However, there appears to be a need for enhancing the indirect influence that EU policy can
have, for example through policies to enhance flood risk information sharing and improve
flood risk assessment. This could in turn play a role in the design of new or reformed
schemes. Currently, concerns about affordability and availability of cover are the key factors
driving the debate about flood insurance. The scale of flood risk and expected future risk
trends are referenced, but do not seem to influence the design of schemes.
Through which instruments this could be achieved and how this could be interwoven with
efforts to maintain affordability and availability is less clear, as our investigation shows.
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The UK and the Netherlands cases both show that risk reduction and insurance are not
closely integrated - neither the unsuccessful insurance plans in the Netherlands nor the
proposed Flood Re scheme in the UK feature strong risk reduction elements. Reflecting on
evidence emerging from other European and indeed international flood insurance schemes,
we notice that this is not an exception, but rather the norm. The potential to use flood
insurance as a lever for flood prevention is far from being exhausted. This is surprising, as
flood prevention is likely to play a much stronger part in securing insurability and
affordability of cover. Risk transfer alone, without consideration of risk reduction efforts, is
not a sustainable solution going forward, particularly in the context of a changing climate.
Moral hazard is a key challenge for any insurance product, but is a very acute problem in the
field of flood insurance because it can undermine the economic benefits of risk transfer and
the wider efforts to reduce risks.
While our investigation focused on the rather narrow field of flood insurance, we believe
that there are a range of parallels to other disaster risks, particularly in the context of climate
change. The debate about flood insurance in Europe highlights the key challenges of
managing current and preparing for future climate risks: At the core lies the issue of
collective versus individual responsibility, and solidarity versus market based approaches.
At EU level there is also the question of subsidiarity versus harmonization – is EU
intervention needed to change the way flood insurance is provided across Europe?
We argue that there is clear scope for the EU to play a greater role in linking risk transfer and
flood risk management and prevention, beyond existing channels, to ensure an integrated
approach to flood risk management across the EU, without resorting to a one-size fits all
solution being imposed. Rather the EU can act in a way that promotes an overarching
objective but allows for a decentralised approach.
Progress in this area will depend on a mix of increased evidence and understanding of
underlying risk issues, better collaboration of stakeholders and openness about limitations
and costs. The issue spans many dimensions, which makes innovation and reform
challenging for political decision makers and private companies. In order to improve the link
with flood insurance and disaster risk reduction in the EU, future research should provide
insight into several issues. Namely: local flood risk estimations and their implications for the
differentiation of premiums according to local risks, the costs and benefits (avoided flood
damage) of flood risk mitigation measures that can be implemented by policyholders and the
performance of such measures under a variety of flooding conditions. In addition the
effectiveness of insurance incentives, such as premium discounts, in stimulating
policyholders to adopt flood risk mitigation measures including possible moral hazard
effects of insurance coverage, and barriers for insurance companies to proactively stimulate
policyholders to limit risks. For incentives to be successful they need to target those who can
take action: While stakeholders have only limited direct control over the occurrence of a
natural disaster, their actions determine the extent of losses during and after the event.
Therefore moral hazard can occur at government level, where the existence of an insurance
scheme may reduce the urgency to prevent and reduce risks, or at the insured level, where
the purchase of insurance may lead to a false sense of security. In theory, risk-based pricing
should help prevent moral hazard and promote risk reduction behaviour. Evidence of how
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this works in practice is limited. Due to affordability concerns this may have to be linked to
public financial support measures at least on a temporary basis.
Here the message from our workshop indicates a clear preference for public funding of flood
risk management, in the form of prevention measures, rather than insurance subsidies.
The workshop discussion also highlights that there are several cases where information on
the costs and benefits of flood risk management is missing. Therefore, there is scope for
continued research, academic or otherwise, into the cost effectiveness of different flood risk
management strategies, including an investigation of how responsive the various
stakeholders are to incentives. Once this research is carried out the findings should be
presented in such a way that it is easily accessible.
Our stakeholder discussions show that there is evidence of a range of further activities
conducted by the insurance industry to foster flood risk management efforts, but it remains
unclear to what extent this is effective at household level and to what extent they could be
scaled up if deemed a success. Other stakeholders may be needed to reflect on the risk
reduction potential, such as property developers, home-builders and mortgage providers in
the context of property insurance.
One other aspect deserving further consideration is the suitability of insurance as opposed to
other mechanisms. It is important to recognise that insurance is not a solution for all flood
risks, and it should always be considered in conjunction with other mechanisms. For
instance the tax system would offer a route to address some of these aspects, but this is often
not deemed politically acceptable. Until today we know very little about the interplay
between different compensation mechanisms and economic instruments.
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Appendix 2
BUSINESS NEED

HABITABLE
AND
COMMERCIAL
BUILDINGS

HOUSING
FLEXIBLE

CLIMATE THREAT

STRATEGIC SOLUTIONS

Increasing frequency and severity of storms
and floods will lead to more frequent and
costly repairs, higher housing and insurance
costs and declining housing quality in difficult
locations. High night-time temperatures will
result in health problems, made worse by
disturbed sleep patterns.

AVOID with building codes fit for 2050s severe
weather and
summer heat
REDUCE through better housing for groups with
poor health profiles
MANAGE with building standards that reduce
leaseholders’ risks

AVOID by only developing low risk areas using site
RISK
DEVELOPMENT
POLICIES

BASED

RELIABLE
TRANSPORTATION

SECURE ENERGY SUPPLIES

SAFE AND SECURE WATER
SUPPLIES

IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED






Coastal regions and low-lying urban centres
will be increasingly affected by flooding,
intense rainfall and storms. Coastal erosion
will accelerate. High density development will
exacerbate drainage and heat island effects.

and building designs fit for 2050s climate
REDUCE by risk reduction in existing properties in
medium/high risk areas
and emergency
support services



High winds, floods, landslips and coastal
storms and erosion will increasingly interrupt
vulnerable road and rail routes, including
strategic links to ports and docks

REDUCE through risk-based preventive management




Increasing frequency and severity of storms
and floods will result in more frequent
interruption of supply and business activity.
Coastal generating capacity is particularly
vulnerable. Foreign supplies may be
unreliable during crises. Hotter summers will
change demand patterns and reduce power
station cooling capacity.

AVOID by ensuring energy security by diversifying

Reduced summer rainfall and more frequent
droughts threaten the volume and quality of
supplies in the regions with the fastest
growing populations.

investment plans

MANAGE by improving flood and coastal defences

for main transport links

MANAGE vulnerable coastal routes and ports
through protection or re-routing
sources,
including micro-generation








AVOID by contractual guarantees on continuity of
foreign supplies

REDUCE by increasing resilience of local distribution



networks

Greater investment in flood defences
Strengthening the Code for Sustainable
Homes, requiring adaptation measures
Higher standards for social housing and
housing for vulnerable groups
Rigorous implementation of PPS25,
including the Growth Areas
Greater investment in flood and coastal
defences
Rigorous implementation of PPS25 based
on improved mapping
Regeneration projects assess and fund
management of climate risks
Home Information Packs to include 2050s
climate risk information
Greater investment in coastal protection
Creation of a national risk register of key
transport routes
Better risk management of key routes and
facilities

RESPONSIBILITY

Defra
CLG
Local authorities
HMT

Defra
CLG
DTI
HMT

DfT
Defra
HMT

Energy Review increases diversity of
supplies and support for local resilience
measures
Strategic assessment of coastal protection
needs of key facilities

DTI
Ofgem

Ofwat incorporate climate scenario
planning into 2010 price review
Incentives for householders to adopt water
saving measures

Ofwat
Defra
HMT

Increased funding of climate-related
research and studentships
Greater business access to publicly funded
climate and geographic data
Wider stakeholder involvement and
partnership working

DTI
HMT

MANAGE by promoting energy efficiency
AVOID by using 2050s climate scenarios for future


REDUCE through demand management in existing
housing



MANAGE through business-friendly restrictions of
supply

WORLD BEATING SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION

Uncertainties in climate modelling lead to
under-estimation of threats affecting critical
infrastructure. New risks overwhelm current
technologies.

AVOID by mainstreaming climate threats and
through multidisciplinary research
REDUCE through further strengthening centres of
excellence in climate science
MANAGE by strengthening academic research links
with business
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AVOID by strengthening building standards for new
WELL EDUCATED
WORKFORCE

HEALTHY PEOPLE

RESILIENT TRADING
PARTNERS

Table

A2:

Table

Current school buildings and timetables are
unsuited to high summer temperatures and
vulnerable to storms and floods, risking poor
learning
conditions
and
increasingly
interrupted education.

build

Higher incidence of exotic diseases, allergenic
and cardiorespiratory conditions will affect
the workforce. Vulnerable dependents
(children and the elderly) will require more
care.

AVOID by improving urban air quality
REDUCE with more effective cardio-respiratory

Climate change impacts vary but will be
earlier and stronger in coastal regions and on
inland waterways, areas of economic
concentration.
Millennium
Development
Goals will be frustrated where drought,
storms and flooding devastate subsistence
agriculture and fledgling industries with
increasing frequency.

of

business

needs

in

REDUCE through planned refurbishment of existing
schools

MANAGE by remodelling school year/day where




buildings
substandard

treatments

MANAGE with strengthened primary care and





public health provisions, including heatwave planning


AVOID through revision of EU legislation to respond
to climate change
REDUCE through strengthened international
cooperation on increasing resilience
MANAGE through international aid taking climate
risks into account

response

to

climate

threats




Revised specifications for new build and
refurbishments, with additional funding
Review of school year planning for 2015
and 2030 conditions

DfES
HMT

Strengthened air quality monitoring and
risk based improvements
Greater preventive healthcare education
Regular updating of heatwave plans

DH
Defra
HMT

EU Green Paper on climate change
reviews all EU-wide measures
Gleneagles (G8) process incorporates
resilience
Aid projects incorporate climate risks and
adaptation

with

solutions,

actions

Whitehall-wide,
especially DfID, CO and
FCO

and

responsibilities.

Key: CLG Communities and Local Government CO Cabinet Office Defra Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs DfES Department for Education
and Skills DfID Department for InternationalDevelopment DfT Department for Transport DH Department of Health DTI Department of Trade and Industry
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office HMT Her Majesty’s Treasury Ofwat The Water Services Regulation Authority Ofgem The Gas and Electricity
Markets Authority
Table source: ABI (2007) Adapting to our changing climate: A manifesto for business, government and the public.
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Appendix 3
Table A3 documents the changes over time of the SoP and the driving factors behind the
change.
Date
1961

2000

Agreement
Main principals
‘Gentleman’s  Agreement
between
Agreement’
government,
British
Insurance Association
(BIA)
and Lloyd’s of London
 Flood cover available as
part
of
a
comprehensive
household policy made
more available
 Right not to grant
insurance cover if area
had a greater than
normal flood risk
 Terms and conditions
of
policy
vary
depending
on
individual
circumstance
‘Gentleman’s  Agreement
between
Agreement’
government
and
industry
 Flood
insurance
included in standard
policy for household
and
standard
businesses up to a risk
level of 1:75 return
period (1.3%)
 Covers both buildings
and contents
 Government commits
to investment in flood
defence, improved risk
data and strengthened
planning system
 Higher risk properties
considered
for
insurance
if
EA
improves defences in
33

Driving factors
Large
floods
in
1952/1953
Large
uninsured
losses
Government
pressure on industry
for solution
Threat of national
disaster fund
Widely available by
the late 1970s

Developments
Initiation
of
flood insurance
for all

Increasing
penetration rate

Increasing flood loss
Lack of investment
in flood defences

Change to more
comprehensive
updated system

the area in the next 5
years*
 Pricing and terms not
affected by SoP
 Cross
subsidization
between
households
(low and high risk)
Officially
2002 ‘Gentleman’s All policies would be Increasing flood loss termed the SoP
Agreement’
renewed in line with the Lack of investment in 2005
above commitments except in flood defences
Increase
in
in
‘exceptional
potential
for
circumstances’.
large excesses
2005 Statement of
Flood losses
and premiums
Principles
2008 Statement of Continued
cover
for Flood
losses,
Principles
properties at significant increasing excesses End of SoP June
2013
flood risk
seen in risk areas
Statement of Principles
does not apply to property
Change
to
built after 1 January 2009.
Flood
Re
in
2015 Flood Re
 A pooled system for Flood losses
summer 2015
high risk properties
Affordability
 Other properties enter ‘Cherry
picking’
the free market
customers
when
 Safeguards
new firms enter the
affordability
and market
availability of insurance
to high risk households
 Small businesses, Band
H
properties
and
‘genuinely uninsurable
properties’
excluded
from the scheme
 Levy
paid
from
insurers to the pool and
topped up (if required)
through
‘ad
hoc’
payments
Table A3: Detail of the evolution of flood insurance in the United Kingdom. *This
requirement although in the Statement of Principles was never fully realised as 5 year
defence plan was not available (Kerr, 2013). (Detail for table taken from: Arnell et al., 1984;
Bek et al., 2013)
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